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Case Comments
CONTRACTUAL VARIATIONS:
CONSIDERATION AND DURESS
By GEOFFREY ENGLAND and NICHOLAS RAFFERTY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Pao On v. Lau Yiu' involved the perennial probem of the
legal enforceability of variations in pre-existing contractual relationships. The
decision is both good and bad. It is good, first, in demonstrating a judicial
willingness to apply the rules of consideration in order to uphold the reason-
able expectations of the parties to the variation; and, secondly, in extending
the doctrine of duress to meet the problem of variations extorted by undue
pressure. It is bad in failing to take the opportunity to escape from the strait-
jacket of consideration in regulating contractual variations.
The relevant facts are complicated. The plaintiffs, owners of all the
shares in the Tsuen Wan Shing On Estate Co., concluded a contract (the
"4main agreement") with the Fu Chip Investment Co. on February 27th, 1973
for the sale of those shares. The defendants were majority shareholders in Fu
Chip. Under the terms of the contract the plaintiffs were to be paid by way
of shares in Fu Chip, the market value of each share being fixed at $2.50.
In addition, the plaintiffs promised that they would retain sixty percent of the
Fu Chip shares alloted to them and not dispose of them before April 30th,
1974. This provision was for the benefit of the defendants, who wished to
protect their investment in Fu Chip against the loss of confidence that would
be occasioned by the plaintiffs suddenly disposing of their newly acquired
Fu Chip shares in the market. For their part, the plaintiffs desired protection
against a drop in value of Fu Chip shares during the year in which they
promised to retain them. Both parties understood and accepted that the
plaintiffs were to be guaranteed against such an eventuality as part of the
bargain. Accordingly, a second agreement (the "subsidiary agreement") was
concluded on February 27th whereby the plaintiffs promised to sell to the
defendants the frozen Fu Chip shares at a price of $2.50 each on or before
April 30th, 1974.
© Copyright, 1980, Geoffrey England and Nicholas Rafferty.
* Professors England and Rafferty are Associate Professors of Law at the University
of Calgary.
1 [1979] 3 All E.R. 65, [1979] 3 W.L.R. 435 (P.C.). On many of the arguments
raised in this comment, see generally Reiter, Courts, Consideration and Common Sense
(1977), 27 U. Toronto L.J. 439; Swan, "Consideration and the Reasons for Enforcing
Contracts," in Reiter & Swan, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 24.
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Shortly after the conclusion of the "subsidiary agreement," the plaintiffs
realized that they had made a bad bargain. Although they were protected
against any fall in value in Fu Chip shares, they could not benefit from any
increase in value. They were bound to retain the shares until the end of April
1974, and at that time were bound to re-sell them at $2.50 each. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs notified the defendants in April 1973 that they would not com-
plete the sale to Fu Chip, as they were bound to do under the "main agree-
ment," unless the "subsidiary agreement" with the defendants was cancelled
and replaced by a guarantee by way of indemnity against any fall in the value
of the shares. The evidence was that the defendants, upon receipt of this
notice, took legal counsel and were advised that the "main agreement" could
be specifically enforced by Fu Chip, or at least that the plaintiffs would be
liable for damages for breach thereof. Moreover, the evidence was that the
defendants estimated that the market value of Fu Chip shares would not fall
over the next year and that the cancellation of the "subsidiary agreement" and
its replacement with a guarantee of indemnity was a calculated risk worth
taking in order to avoid the delay and adverse publicity of litigation over the
"main agreement." Thus the parties cancelled the "subsidiary agreement" and
on May 4th, 1973 concluded an agreement whereby the defendants, "in
consideration of your [the plaintiffs] having at our request agreed to"2 go
ahead with the "main agreement," promised to indemnify the plaintiffs against
any fall in value of the "frozen" Fu Chip shares below the guaranteed price
of $2.50 per share that might have occurred by the end of April, 1974. In
the event of the defendants having to pay an indemnity, the plaintiffs granted
them an option to re-purchase the shares at the price of $2.50 each. The
evidence was that both parties saw the contract of guarantee as part and
parcel of the "main agreement" being completed and that both parties con-
sidered themselves immediately bound by it.
It transpired that the value of Fu Chip shares slumped between May 4th,
1973 and April, 1974. At no time did the defendants put the plaintiffs on
notice that they did not consider themselves bound by the May 4th agreement.
In April 1974 the defendants refused to indemnify the plaintiffs under the
terms of the agreement. The plaintiffs sued in the alternative for damages or
for specific performance of the May 4th agreement.
The case involved two issues: first, whether the May 4th agreement of
indemnity was supported by consideration in order to render it enforceable;
secondly, assuming that the May 4th agreement was supported by considera-
tion, whether the defendants' consent to it was procured by economic duress
so as to render it voidable. At trial, judgment was given for the plaintiffs.
In the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, the majority found for the defendants
on the first issue but agreed unanimously with the trial judge that there was
no evidence of economic duress. The Privy Council held in favour of the
plaintiffs on both issues.
2 Id. at 73 (All E.R.), 444 (W.L.R.).
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II. THE CONSIDERATION ISSUE
The courts have enforced a modification of an existing contractual re-
lationship where there has been a mutual rescission of the old contract and
the substitution of a wholly new one, or some extra consideration flowing
from the promisee over and above his promise to perform the existing con-
tract, or a seal, or possibly a promissory estoppel operating against the promi-
sor.3 In Pao On the Board of the Privy Council was able to find consideration
to support the defendants' promise of an indemnity in two ways.
First, the Board held that the defendants' promise of indemnity was
supported by the plaintiffs' promises to Fu Chip under the "main agreement."
In the Board's opinion, the plaintiffs' promises under the "main agreement,"
although they pre-dated the formation of the May 4th agreement, could not be
regarded as past consideration. The Board, applying the well known passage
of Bowen L.J. in Re Casey's Patents, Stewart v. Casey4 held that an act done
before the making of a promise can amount to consideration for that later
promise provided that: (1) the act was done at the promisor's request; (2)
both parties understood that the act was to be paid for by some subsequent
conferral of a benefit; (3) the subsequent benefit would have constituted
valid consideration had it been conferred in advance of the performance of
the act.
As to the first requirement, the plaintiffs' contractual promises to Fu
Chip under the "main agreement" were clearly procured at the request of
the defendants, majority shareholders in that company. Moreover, the lan-
guage of the May 4th agreement of indemnity expressly stated that the de-
fendants' promise of indemnity was "in consideration of your [the plaintiffs]
having at our request agreed to"5 enter into the contract of sale with Fu Chip.
As to the second requirement, the Board considered that the realities of
the transaction between the parties as well as the wording of the May 4th
agreement showed that both sides clearly intended that the plaintiffs were to
be offered protection against potential loss in value of the shares as an
essential component of the entire transaction. In effect, the parties always
contemplated that, as part of the whole bargain, the plaintiffs would be pro-
tected against a fall in the value of the shares that they had promised not to
sell for one year. The Board said that it did not matter whether the indemnity
was regarded as,
the best evidence of the benefit intended to be conferred in return for the promise
not to sell, or as the positive bargain which fixes the benefit on the faith of which
3 Estoppel and the seal were not issues in the Pao On case. The Privy Council men-
tioned the possibility of a mutual rescission of the "subsidiary agreement" as supporting
the May 4th replacement agreement. The rescission, however, did not stand alone; rather
the cancellation of the "subsidiary agreement" was "part and parcel of a comprehensive
settlement accepted by Lau [the defendants] as the best and most effective way of securing
early completion of the main agreement.... " Id. at 72 (All E.R.), 443 (W.L.R.).
4 Re Casey's Patents, [1892] 1 Ch. 104, 40 W.R. 180, 9 R.P.C. 9 (C.A.).
5 Supra note 1, at 73 (All E.R.), 444 (W.L.R.).
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the promise was given, though where, as here, the subject is a written contract,
the better analysis is probably that of the "positive bargain."
As to the third requirement, the Board followed its earlier decision in
New Zealand Shipping Co. v. A.M. Satterthwaite and Co. 7 which held the per-
formance of, or the promise to perform, a pre-existing contractual duty owed
to a third party can amount to valid consideration because "the promisee
obtains the benefit of a direct obligation." s Thus the plaintiffs' promise to
honour the "main agreement" with Fu Chip at the request of the defendants
was enough to support the defendants' promise of an indemnity in the May
4th agreement. Although there may be logical difficulties in justifying this
rule in terms of the benefit-detriment analysis of consideration,9 there is no
doubt that, as a matter of convenience and reality, the defendants obtained
what they considered to be a valuable commercial advantage from the plain-
tiffs going through with the "main agreement." To have invalidated the May
4th agreement for technical deficiencies in consideration would have flown in
the face of both sides' reasonable expectations. As with the Satterthwaite
case, this decision is a good example of the courts' willingness to be flexible
in their application of the doctrine of consideration in order to uphold the
reasonable expectations of contracting parties who may wish to re-adjust
certain particulars of their relationship within the framework of one, overall
transaction.
The second way in which the Board was able to find consideration for
the promise of indemnification lay in the granting of an option by the plaintiffs
to the defendants in the May 4th agreement to buy back the shares at $2.50
each. That option could be exercised by the defendants only if they were called
upon to indemnify the plaintiffs under the terms of the agreement. The plain-
tiffs had, therefore, undertaken an extra obligation, albeit of a contingent
nature, which supported the defendants' promise of an indemnity. This again
illustrates the courts' willingness to find consideration to support variations
where one party technically undertakes some extra obligations, as was the
case in The Atlantic Baron,'0 which is discussed below.
The defendants also argued that a promise to perform, or the per-
formance of, an existing contractual duty can amount to an illegal considera-
tion as being contrary to public policy, if there has been an abuse of a
dominant bargaining position by means of a threat to repudiate a pre-existing
contractual obligation. The Privy Council firmly rejected the defendants' con-
tention. Where consideration exists, as in Pao On, a contract cannot be at-
tacked on such vague public policy grounds unless the elements of a success-
6ld. at 75 (All E.R.), 446 (W.L.R.). The parties, in effect, would be fixing the value
of a quantum meruit claim for services rendered. See Treitel, The Law of Contract (5th
ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1979) at 59-60.
7 [1975] A.C. 154, [197411 All E.R. 1015, [1974] 2 W.L.R. 865 (P.C.).
8 Id. at 168 (A.C.), 1021 (All E.R.), 871 (W.L.R.) per Lord Wilberforce.
9 See Treitel, supra note 6, at 75-77.
' North Ocean Shipping Co. v. Hyundai Construction Co., [1979] Q.B. 705, [1978]
3 All E.R. 1170, [1979] 3 W.L.R. 419.
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ful defence of duress have been established." Furthermore, such a rule of
public policy would lead to an anomaly: a contract that is contrary to public
policy is void, whereas a contract coerced by duress is merely voidable. 12
The Privy Council was right in holding that the doctrine of duress must
determine the effect of an abuse of a dominant bargaining position. The
unfortunate aspect of the Board's judgment lies in its refusal to break away
from the rigours of consideration in the context of contractual variations.
Within that framework, there is no doubt that the courts will strive to find
some technical consideration, especially where a party has relied on the
variation, as in Pao On itself. Nevertheless, the Privy Council upheld the
position that one party does not furnish consideration to another by perform-
ing, or promising to perform, an existing contractual duty owed to that other
party. Whatever doubts'-' exist about the true explanation of cases like Stilk
v. Myrick 4 and Harris v. Watson,15 those decisions must be rationalized,
according to the Privy Council, 16 on the basis of no consideration. 17
The result of the Stilk doctrine is that a court may be compelled to strike
down perfectly reasonable business arrangements. Conditions existing at the
time of the formation of a contract rarely remain static during the life of that
contract. Often it is reasonable for a seller, for example, to pass on a price
increase to his buyer. Cases such as Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University Constr.
Ltd.,18 however, show that such variations must be forced into the straitjacket
of consideration.
The deficiencies of the traditional "consideration" approach to enforcing
contractual variations are highlighted by judicial willingness to find some
further nominal consideration and by the increasing use of promissory estop-
pel as a protective device for parties who act in reasonable reliance upon a
variation being binding. Recent cases suggest that the courts are applying very
liberally the traditional requirements of the doctrine of promissory estoppel
in order to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties. Grange J., for
example, in Re Tudale Explorations Ltd.19 stated obiter that he could not see
the logic of the distinction between allowing estoppel to be used as a shield
and not as a sword where one party is seeking to enforce a modification in an
11 Supra note 1, at 77-79 (All E.R.), 448-50 (W.L.R.). The duress issue is discussed
below in section M11 of this comment.
12 Id. at 78 (All E.R.), 449 (W.L.R.).
13 These doubts are best expressed in Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Columbus:
Ohio State Univ. Press, 1974) at 21-28.
14 (1809), 2 Camp. 317, 170 E.R. 1168 (N.P.).
15 (1791), Peake 102, 170 E.R. 94 (N.P.).
16Supra note 1, at 77 (All E.R.), 448 (W.L.R.).
17 The Privy Council did recognize that some of the cases dealing with a pre-existing
duty imposed by law could be explained on public policy grounds. However, "such cases
are also explicable on the ground that a person who promises to perform, or performs, a
duty imposed by law provides no consideration." Id.
18 [1973 3 O.R. 268, 36 D.L.R. (3d) 496, afl'd 67 D.L.R. (3d) 606 (C.A.).
19 (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 593 (Div. Ct.).
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existing contractual relationship. 20 It has been convincingly argued2' that the
doctrine should be available to enforce consensual variations in cases like
Gilbert Steel"s because its effect is merely to modify the balance of the bargain
in a manner agreed upon by the parties and not to foist a new bargain on an
unwilling party. To re-adjust the scales of the original consideration in this
way is not to challenge the need for some consideration.
Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently stated that, for the
purpose of determining whether the promisor has the requisite intention to
modify an existing legal relationship, the courts can infer such intent where
the promisor knows, or ought to know "as a matter of common business
sense," that the promisee is likely to regard the promise as affecting their
legal relations.23 The parties need not actually sit down together and mutually
agree to alter their existing relationship.2 4 Rather, the courts will look to the
reasonable expectations of the promisee, having regard to normal business
practices, to fix the promisor with the requisite intent.2"
Promissory estoppel, however, is not the perfect solution to the regu-
lation of contractual variations. There is still doubt as to whether a promisor
can retract his promise upon giving reasonable notice, notwithstanding that
its scope is permanent. 26 Moreover, it is questionable whether the promisee
must incur some detriment, on the strength of the promise, over and above
performing his obligations as varied.27 Finally, there are decisions like Gilbert
Steel,28 which reject the use of promissory estoppel to enable one party to
enforce positively a contractual variation so as to obtain an extra benefit, such
as a price increase.
It can be argued that the doctrine of consideration can be utilized to
serve a valuable purpose. If one party (A) threatens to break his contract in
order to compel the other party (B) to confer some further benefit on A,
such as a price increase, and A knows of B's precarious financial position,
then the consideration doctrine may prevent such extortion from being
effective.29
20 Id. at 597.
21 McRae, The Extension of Options and Equitable Estoppel (1979), 3 Can. Bus.
L.J. 426.
22 Supra note 18.
23 Owen Sound Public Library Rd. v. Mial Dev. Ltd. (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 459,
8 R.P.R. 113 (C.A.).
24 Contrast the approach taken in the Owen Sound case, id., with that taken by the
Supreme Court of Canada in John Burrows Ltd. v. Subsurface Surveys, [1968] S.C.R. 607,
68 D.L.R. (2d) 354.
25 Good examples in the context of collective bargaining administration are Re City
of Penticton (1978), 18 L.A.C. (2d) 307 (B.C.L.R.B.) (Weiler); Re Craftsmen Floors
(B.C.) Ltd., [1980] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 63 (B.C.L.R.B.) (Gallagher).
26 Many of the authorities are cited in Treitel, supra note 6, at 94-96.
27 Contrast WJ. Alan & Co. v. El Nasr Import & Export Co., [1972] 2 Q.B. 189,
[1972] 2 All E.R. 127, [1972] 2 W.L.R. 800 (C.A.) with Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University
Constr. Ltd., supra note 18, and Re Tudale Explorations Ltd., supra note 19.
28 Supra note 18.
29 An example of such duress is D. & C. Builders v. Rees, [1966] 2 Q.B. 617, [1966]
3 All E.R. 837, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 288 (C.A.).
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The fact, however, that consideration may help prevent one party from
forcing a variation in a contract by means of duress does not mean that the
doctrine of consideration should be retained in these circumstances. First,
there are two important limitations upon the availability of relief through the
doctrine of consideration. Consideration is of no assistance if A is wise
enough to furnish some extra nominal, though legally sufficient, consideration.
Moreover, it is submitted that the lack of consideration is irrelevant as soon as
B performs the varied contract by, for example, actually paying the price
increase. While the variation is still executory, the lack of consideration
prevents A from enforcing the contract as varied. Once the variation has been
executed by B, however, B cannot recover the benefit conferred simply by
alleging lack of consideration. B can recover the benefit only if he can estab-
lish that the conferral was not made voluntarily. If lack of consideration were
sufficient to ground recovery, then any gift could be retracted. This point
seems to have been recognized by Mocatta J. in The Atlantic Baron30 where
he assumed that it would not have been sufficient for the plaintiff merely to
establish that there had been no consideration for the price increase once the
increased payments had been made. The plaintiff would also have had to
establish that the price increase had not been paid voluntarily in order to close
the transaction. 31 In fact Mocatta J. determined that consideration had been
furnished for the price increase32 in that case and so this issue did not arise for
decision.
Secondly, it is nonsensical to attack what is essentially a duress problem
by the doctrine of consideration. The concept of duress is sufficiently flexible
to deal with this problem without the need to resort to technical notions of
consideration. The employment of consideration means that there is the
danger of reasonable compromises being struck down as well as the danger
that coerced settlements may escape the scrutiny of the courts because of the
presence of further nominal consideration or because of the fact that the
variation has been executed. The important point is that, in all situations of
contractual variation, the relevant factor in maintaining or striking down the
amendment must be whether the variation was freely and voluntarily agreed
to by the parties or whether it was the product of unfair dominance by one
over the other. Such a rule would enable the courts to uphold legitimate re-
adjustments between businessmen in cases like Pao On and Gilbert Steel,
having regard to the realities surrounding the variation rather than to the
formalities of consideration.
III. THE DURESS ISSUE
The defendants in Pao On also contended that their consent to the May
4th agreement had been secured by the duress of the plaintiffs in threatening
3 0 Supra note 10, at 721 (Q.B.), 1184 (All E.R.), 434 (W.L.R.).
31 The point is also recognized by Cornish, Economic Duress (1966), 29 Mod. L.
Rev. 428 and Coote, Duress by Threatened Breach of Contract, [1980] Camb. L.J. 40.
32 Supra note 10, at 714 (Q.B.), 1178 (All E.R.), 427 (W.L.R.).
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not to proceed with the "main agreement." The Board rejected that argument
on the ground that there had been no coercion of the defendants' will so as to
vitiate consent.33 The defendants had made a reasoned decision to avoid
litigation by entering into the May 4th agreement in the belief that there was
no real risk involved in executing the indemnity. There was "commercial
pressure, but no coercion. '34 The importance of the Pao On case lies not so
much in the decision on this issue but in the recognition of the availability
of relief in duress in the area of contractual variations.
In the past, substantial restrictions have been placed upon the use of
duress in these circumstances. There was a reluctance to recognize forms of
economic duress. Duress of goods was the only species of economic duress
recognized by the courts. There was no concept of duress by threatened
breach of contract. Such a concept would impeach the finality of bona fide
settlements of contractual claims. Moreover, an illogical distinction was drawn
between the recovery of money paid under duress of goods and the setting
aside of contracts induced by such pressure. Money paid under such duress
could be recovered but a contract could not be invalidated for the same
reason.3 5 The Pao On decision, following two earlier English cases 3 has now
done away with these restrictions and so has enabled the courts to address
openly the real issues rather than hide behind the doctrine of consideration.
In recognizing the concept of duress by threatened breach of contract,
the recent English decisions are by no means in the forefront of the common
law. Both the United States and other parts of the Commonwealth had
previously admitted the possibility of duress by a threat to refuse to perform
a contract 37 In particular, there is a line of Australian authority to that end.
Nixon v. Furphy"8 and Re Hooper and Grass' Contract0 each involved a
contract for the sale of land and the court in each case drew an analogy with
duress of goods. In effect the payer already had an equitable interest in the
land because of the availability of specific performance. Nevertheless, the
language used by the judges was wide enough to embrace a threatened inter-
ference with any type of contract. In Nixon, for instance, Long-Innes J. relied
upon40 the following broad dicta of Isaacs J. in Smith v. William Charlick Ltd.:
'Compulsion' in relation to a payment of which refund is sought ... includes every
species of duress or conduct analogous to duress, actual or threatened, exerted by
or on behalf of the payee and applied to the person or the property or any right
of the person who pays, or, in some cases, of a person related to or in affinity with
3 3 Supra note 1, at 78-79 (All E.R.), 450-51 (W.L.R.).
34 Id. at 78 (All E.R.), 450 (W.L.R.).
35 Contrast Astley v. Reynolds (1731), 2 Stra. 915, 93 E.R. 939 (K.B.) with Skeate
v. Beale (1840), 11 Ad. & El. 983, 113 E.R. 688 (Q.B.). See generally Beatson, Duress
as a Vitiating Factor in Contract, [1974] Camb. L.J. 97.
36 Occidental Worldwide Investment Corp. v. Skibs AIs Avanti, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
293 (Q.B.) [hereinafter The Siboen and the Sibotre] and The Atlantic Baron, supra note
10.
37 See generally Sutton, Duress by Threatened Breach of Contract (1974), 20
McGill L.J. 554.
38 (1925), 25 N.S.W. St. R. 151 (H.C.).
39 [1949] V.L.R. 269, 56 A.L.R. 1005 (H.C.).
40 Supra note 38, at 160.
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him. Such compulsion is a legal wrong, and the law provides a remedy by raising
a fictional promise to repay. [Emphasis added.]41
The most recent step was taken in T. A. Sundell & Sons v. Emrn Yan-
noulatos (Overseas) Pty. Ltd.42 where relief in duress was extended to a
threatened breach of a contract for the sale of goods. The Court pointed out
that economic duress was not limited to situations where one party threatened
to withhold some proprietary right from the other but also embraced a re-
fusal to perform any contractual duty.
In Canada the law has not gone this far. In the leading decision, Knutson
v. Bourkes Syndicate,43 the plaintiff Syndicate had agreed to buy certain land
held by the defendant. The defendant refused to transfer the land unless cer-
tain payments, over and above what were due, were made to him. This refusal
was made in good faith. The plaintiff made these payments so as to secure
title to the land so that a further agreement to transfer the land could be
carried out. The Supreme Court of Canada held that these additional pay-
ments could be recovered. The Court pointed out that the syndicate had be-
come the equitable owner of the land and relied upon the duress of goods
cases. There has, therefore, been no Canadian case which is as far-reaching
as the Sundell decision.
It was this Commonwealth line of authority, and in particular the
Australian cases, which inspired the English courts to recognize duress by
threatened breach of contract. The three English decisions cover a variety of
contracts: a contract of charterparty in The Siboen and the Sibotre,44 a
contract for the construction of an oil tanker in The Atlantic Baron,4 5 and a
contract for the sale of shares in Pao On. The English courts, therefore, have
not restricted duress by threatened breach of contract to contracts for the sale
of land. No particular analogy was drawn with the duress of goods cases. It
is hoped that these decisions will lead to a corresponding extension of duress
in Canada.
In one major respect, the English cases advance the law of duress further
than the Australian decisions. It is recognized that economic duress of what-
ever variety is a ground for setting aside an otherwise valid contract. No
longer is any distinction to be drawn between the recovery of money and the
rescission of a contract. Kerr J. in The Siboen and the Sibotre, gives the
following example of when a contract may be set aside for economic duress:
For instance, if I should be compelled to sign a lease or some other contract for a
nominal but legally sufficient consideration under an imminent threat of having my
house burnt down or a valuable picture slashed, though without any threat of
physical violence to anyone, I do not think that the law would uphold the agree-
ment. I think that a plea of coercion or compulsion would be available in such
cases. 40
41 (1924), 34 C.L.R. 38 at 56, 30 A.L.R. 246 at 251 (H.C.).
42 (1956), 56 N.S.W. St. R. 323 (S.C.).
43 [1941] S.C.R. 419, [19411 3 D.L.R. 593.
44 Supra note 36.
4 5 Supra note 10.
4 0 Supra note 36, at 335.
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
This reasoning was applied by Mocatta J. in The Atlantic Baron.47 In
that case, a ship owning company entered into a contract with a shipbuilder
for the construction of an oil tanker. The price was payable in United States
dollars by instalments. After the first instalment had been paid, the U.S. dollar
was devalued by ten percent and the builder demanded a corresponding price
increase in the remaining instalments and threatened to terminate the contract
if such an increase was not forthcoming. The owners had negotiated a
profitable charterparty with a third party for the tanker when completed. Not
wishing to lose that contract, they agreed to pay the ten percent increase on
the remaining instalments, even though they were advised that the builder had
no legal basis for his claim. The later instalments were, therefore, paid at the
increased price and the ship was delivered. The owners then sued some eight
months later to recover the extra ten percent on the ground that it had been
paid under duress. Mocatta J. held that the builder had furnished considera-
tion for the variation in price by increasing a letter of credit that he had
opened to secure the repayment of any instalments made if he should default
on his contractual obligations. Nevertheless, Mocatta J. held that the owners
had been compelled to enter into the agreement to pay the additional ten
percent by the builder's threatened breach of contract and that such economic
duress rendered the agreement voidable. He summarized his conclusions very
clearly:
First, I do not take the view that the recovery of money paid under duress other
than to the person is necessarily limited to duress of goods falling within one of the
categories hitherto established by the English cases. ... Secondly, from this it
follows that the compulsion may take the form of 'economic duress' if the neces-
sary facts are proved. A threat to break a contract may amount to such 'economic
duress.' Thirdly, if there has been such a form of duress leading to a contract for
consideration, I think that contract is a voidable one which can be avoided and
the excess money paid under it recovered. 48
The owners, in fact, were not allowed to rescind the contract because
they were taken to have affirmed the contractual variation by their failure to
register any protests in paying the increased instalments and by their delay
in seeking recovery of the excess instalments.
In Pao On the Privy Council, on the basis of The Siboen and the Sibotre
and The Atlantic Baron, accepted that "there is nothing contrary to principle
in recognizing economic duress as a factor which may render a contract
voidable, . . .- 49 The recent English decisions, therefore, have opened up the
possibility of the doctrine of duress being used to prevent contractual varia-
tions being extorted by undue pressure. The doctrine of consideration is totally
inadequate for this purpose.
Finally, there is the difficult question of when a threatened breach of
contract will amount to duress. Kerr J., in The Siboen and the Sibotre, re-jected counsel's submission that "the defence of duress is made out whenever
one party to a contract threatens to commit a breach of it and the other party
agrees to vary or cancel the contract under this threat because it has no
47 Supra note 10.
48 Id. at 719 (Q.B.), 1182 (All E.R.), 432 (W.L.R.).
49 Supra note 1, at 79 (All E.R.), 451 (W.L.R.).
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effective legal remedy in respect of the threatened breach and has in this
sense been compelled to agree."5 Not every threatened breach of contract to
which one party submits should amount to duress. There is an obvious policy
favouring the finality of settlements of contractual claims. A line has to be
drawn between benefits conferred under duress and benefits conferred volun-
tarily. One party may, for example, quite freely pay a price increase demanded
by another, although under no legal obligation to do so. The demand may
have been made in good faith in the belief that the increase was justified by
the contract itself and the payer may want to make the extra payment simply
to settle the dispute. Alternatively, the demand may have been made, with
knowledge that the increase is not justified by the contract, in the belief that
it is morally justified because of changed circumstances since the making of
the contract and the payer may pay the increase because he does not think
it is an unreasonable demand in those circumstances.
The recent English decisions offer little guidance as to when a threatened
breach of contract will amount to duress. They contain general statements that
the pressure must be such as to overcome the will of the victim so as to vitiate
his consent. In Pao On, the Privy Council isolated the following factors:
In determining whether there was a coercion of will such that there was no true
consent, it is material to enquire whether the person alleged to have been coerced
did or did not protest; whether, at the time he was allegedly coerced into making
the contract, he did or did not have an alternative course open to him such as an
adequate legal remedy; whether he was independently advised; and whether after
entering the contract he took steps to avoid it.51
Some assistance can be elicited from the American cases. The American
courts are particularly reluctant to find duress unless it can be established
that the victim urgently required the contract to be fulfilled. Relief in duress,
therefore, is made to depend upon the particular circumstances of the victim.
Fuld C. J. emphasized this point in Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp.:
However, a mere threat by one party to breach the contract by not delivering the
required items, though wrongful, does not in itself constitute economic duress. It
must also appear that the threatened party could not obtain the goods from another
source of supply and that the ordinary remedy of an action for breach of contract
would not be adequate.0 2
Professor Coote also favours an approach that considers the severity of
the consequences for the victim of the threatened breach of contract. In his
opinion, this is where the distinction lies between The Atlantic Baron, where
duress was established, and Pao On, where it was not.53 In the former case,
the threatened breach would have deprived the shipowners of earning a
substantial profit from a third party as well as forced them to break their con-
tract with that third party. In the latter, the threatened party stood to lose
little by resisting the pressure. Therefore, "given a demonstrated reluctance
to enter the disputed contract, the determinant will be, not the will of the
50 Supra note 36, at 334-35.
51 Supra note 1, at 78 (All E.R.), 450 (W.L.R.).
02 29 N.Y. 2d 124 at 130-31, 324 N.Y.S. 2d 22 at 25-26, 272 N.E. 2d 533 at 535
(1971).
53 Supra note 31, at 45.
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victim as such, but the scale of the consequences to him of resisting the
pressure." 54
It is submitted that it is not sufficient to consider solely the effect of the
breach of contract upon the victim. The position of the "oppressor" should
also be considered. A threatened breach of contract should not automatically
be a sufficiently wrongful act for the purpose of duress. It should be sufficient
only if the resulting transaction is inherently unreasonable. Is the "oppressor"
merely seeking a way of acquiring some ready money or is he making a
demand which is quite reasonable in light of all the circumstances?
The bounds of duress by threatened breach of contract will have to be
established by later decisions. At least the recent English cases have made that
enquiry possible. There is no longer a blanket rule that duress cannot include
a threatened breach of contract or that economic duress cannot invalidate
an otherwise binding contract. The doctrine of consideration, with all its
faults, will no longer play a part except in so far as the presence of substantial
consideration will be relevant to the question of whether a contractual variation
was accepted voluntarily.
54 Id.
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